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Abstract
Recent use of Electronic Medical Records in the hospitals has raised many
privacy concerns regarding confidential patient information which can be
accessed by various users in the hospital’s complex and dynamic environment.
There has been considerable success in developing strategies to detect insider
threats in healthcare information systems based on what one might call the
random object access model or ROA. This approach models illegitimate users
who randomly access records. The goal is to use statistics, machine learning,
knowledge of hospital workflows and other techniques to support an anomaly
detection framework that finds such users.
In this work we introduce and study a random topic access model, RTA,
aimed at the users whose access may well be illegitimate but is not fully ran-
dom because it is focused on common hospital themes. We argue that this
model is appropriate for a meaningful range of attacks and develop a system
based on topic summarization that is able to formalize the model and provide
anomalous user detection for it. We also propose a framework for evaluating
the ability to recognize various types of random users called random topic
access detection, or RTAD. The proposed RTAD framework is an unsuper-
vised detection model which is a combination of Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA), for feature extraction, and a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) algorithm
for outlier detection. The analysis is done on the dataset from Northwestern
Memorial Hospital which consists of over 5 million accesses made by 8000
users to 14,000 patients in a four month time period. Our results show vary-
ing degrees of success based on user roles and the anticipated characteristics
of attackers and evaluate the ability to identify different adversarial types
relevant to the hospital ecosystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
Healthcare Information Technology is suffering because of lack of relevant
data mining and information retrieval techniques to assist patient care. While
many factors have been implicated in causing this issue, a lack of proper
security measures looms largest. Despite the recent legislative efforts such
as the HIPAA privacy rule [2] to legally mandate the protection of private
healthcare information, issues still persist regarding patient privacy. These
problems do not stem from the lack of awareness, but rather a lack of effective
practical solutions. This paper aims to address one of the distinct challenges
in implementing effective healthcare security measures: detecting anomalous
activity. This central challenge, as well as some of the other mitigating
problems plaguing the industry, is discussed in further detail in 1.2. However,
to first provide a solid contextual understanding of the problem statement, an
introduction into the basics of healthcare workflow dynamics and information
architecture is provided in section 1.1. The section 1.2 refines the initial
motivation and focuses the analysis on a specific component of the issues
in healthcare security. A novel solution to this specific issue is described in
section 1.3 and section 1.4 outlines the organization of this logic. 1
1.1 Overview of Electronic Medical Record
The authors in [4] define EMR as an application environment composed of the
clinical data repository, clinical decision support, controlled medical vocabu-
lary, order entry, computerized provider order entry, pharmacy, and clinical
documentation applications. This environment is used by many healthcare
practitioners to document and monitor patient’s electronic medical record
1The key contribution of this thesis will appear in “Proceedings of IEEE International
Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2013” [3].
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Electronic Medical Record 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient Name :  Anonymous                                                       CURRENT  DRUG  HISTPORT 
I.D. No.          :  442.0998728                                                   
 
Recent Diagnosis :   Hypertension,  Type II  
Diabetes , Unspecified Hypothyroidism                                                                              
 
Recent Procedures performed: manually  
assisted delivery , Medical induction of labor 
 
Drugs Available for Diagnostic  Profile :                                
Aspirin, Oxytocin, Cefazolin                                                 
 
Patient Location : Prentice 13 
 
Patient Service: Obstetrics 
                                                                              
 
Consultant : Anonymous 
Role : NMH Physician-CPOE 
 
Last prescribed drugs: 
 
DRUG                                     DOSE 
Becotide 250                       2/day
Ampicillin                1/day 
 
Drug Allergies :  None 
Patient Notes: [04/20/2013] 
This patient was admitted on 04/10/2013 in the 
emergency department because of severe labor 
pain. She has been diagnosed with hypertension 
and was operated for manually assisted delivery 
on 04/15/2013. She is more stable and healthy 
now. Her recent prescription of drugs has been 
changed because she is recovering fast. I 
recommend taking her X rays and radiology test 
by today evening.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Mock EMR of a Patient
which may consist of diagnosis of the patient in an encounter, procedures
operated on him, medication history, his location and services during the
hospital stay etc. One main advantage of such a system is an ease of commu-
nication between the clinicians in different departments (i.e., nurses, physical
therapists, and respiratory therapists) in the hospital for managing effective
patient care. However, [4] further differentiates EHR from EMR. An EHR on
the other hand is a subset of each care delivery organizations EMR, presently
assumed to be summaries like ASTM’s Continuity of Care Record (CCR) or
HL7’s Continuity of Care Document (CCD), is owned by the patient and has
patient input and access that spans episodes of care across multiple CDOs
within a community, region, or state (or in some countries, the entire coun-
try). An EMR is also used to provide documentation that a patient was seen
or a test was performed so that the clinician can obtain reimbursement by
an insurance company or government agency [5].
Figure 1.1 shows a sample EMR of a patient in any hospital. The Figure
shows the medical record of an anonymous patient in the hospital and her
health history. The record shows the patient was admitted on 04/10/2013
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under severe labor pain. She was diagnosed with hypertension and later went
through manually assisted delivery. The contents of the notes are taken by
different clinicians accessing the EMR for patient care. This medical record
may store very confidential information about a patient. There are several
clinicians constantly accessing these EMR systems which give rise to many
privacy concerns related to patient data being compromised. The authors
in [6] discuss similar privacy and security considerations of medical records
from being exploited by external harmful entities.
1.2 Problem Statement
Though many systems claim to implement role based access control but be-
cause of the dynamic nature of healthcare environment, it is more likely that
these roles will break their access privileges in the case of emergency situa-
tions. In such cases, there is a potential threat to the patient information
if the access is made because of some prior hidden motive. The lack of ex-
perience based access control [7] is one of the major security drawbacks in
such systems. The condition is going to be worse when we have genomic
data available in each patient’s EMR. Imagine some curious users trying to
access an EMR of a celebrity, an employer accessing EMR of an employee
he wants to hire to assess his personality or even a girl seeking an EMR of
the boy to approve marriage. Just by looking at the EMR anyone will be
able to confirm the patient’s health prospects, intelligence and family health
history. Lack of publicly available data constraints the researchers to carry
out any consequential research in the field of healthcare. In the hospital envi-
ronment, access control is almost completely dominated by usability. Under
no circumstances should an employee be denied access to resources that are
critical to patient health. Also, the work load and the employment costs of
health specialists are so large that it is economically inefficient to install time-
consuming security measures. Therefore, the enforcement of access control
policies is often very weak. To achieve compliance, all accesses to resources
are logged in audit logs such that i) fraud can be detected in the future and
ii) knowing that access is being tracked, employees comply in the presence.
The main problem with this approach is that the sheer amount of data that
is being saved exceeds what a human can manually overlook. This situation
3
demands for automatic or semi-automatic approaches to analyze audit logs.
1.2.1 Summary of the Main Challenges
Let us summarize our discussion in 1.1 and 1.2 pertaining to the existing
limitations of the security measures in the current EMR systems and lack of
relevant mining techniques for automated patient care. Some of the major
challenges in the present systems are as follows:
1. The current systems are based on Role Based Access Control where
access is granted based on the roles of the clinicians accessing the med-
ical record. But, healthcare is a dynamic and collaborative environ-
ment where the role privileges might need to be changed in the case of
emergency situations. These systems are unable to detect unexplained
accesses made by the clinicians in such an environment.
2. There are millions of access logs which get generated by the clinicians
accessing patient medical records in short amount of time. There is a
need to build high end auditing tools to analyze these huge access log
dataset to learn and infer the characteristics of the clinicians based on
their accesses to the patients.
3. There is no inference on the patient and clinician relationship based
on the accesses made by these entities to the patients throughout the
encounter. There is lack of data mining in place to mine such informa-
tion and use it for patient care and security.
4. Current research in the field of EMR security does not focus on de-
tection methods pertaining to flag clinicians having non-random but
suspicious behavior in their access patterns. For instance, clinicians
who are not accessing random patients, but have prior knowledge of
the hospital workflow and interested in particular type of patients.
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1.3 Approach to the Problem
Our approach to this problem is an anomaly detection framework that takes
a history of audit logs as an input and builds a semantic relationship between
the user-patient accesses by typing the user based on different kind of patients
accessed by him. Then we can detect different types of anomalous users in
the system. At the heart of the method (and at the heart of the problem
really) lies the notion of typicality that must be established based on the
input.
Much of the current work on anomaly detection in hospitals has focused
on what one might call the Random Object Access (ROA) where the object
in question is a patient electronic medical record. In this model, illegitimate
users are modeled as ones who access patient records randomly. This is
a plausible model since illegitimate accesses may look random as they are
often based on features that lie outside the medical system (like accessing
the record of a famous actor with an ordinary disease). However, the model
may not apply well to the open terminal case since the users are not making
random accesses; they are making accesses that are appropriate to their
roles while ascribing these to a user for whom the action is not appropriate.
Consider also a related problem, where a user is doing tasks that should
be done by another user. This behavior may be inappropriate, but it will
probably not look like accessing random patient records.
A key contribution of this thesis (to appear in [3]) is the following: This
thesis proposes a new approach to anomaly detection based on the Random
Topic Access (RTA) model. RTA models illegitimate user behavior as ran-
dom accesses to “topics” rather than objects. In this case a topic is an idea
derived from the field of natural language processing, where, for instance, an
algorithm is used on a corpus of articles to derive groups of words that often
occur together and represent key topics of the articles. In our case we apply
these techniques to patients, who play a role similar to articles, whereas the
data in the patient medical records plays the role of words. The idea is to
derive a model of the topics in the hospital (common groups of properties
of patients) and to use these to characterize the interests of users, who can
be viewed as “readers” of these topics. An RTA user is one who accesses a
collection of topics at random. This is subtly different from an ROA user,
whose access to patients is random. The RTA is useful for detecting anoma-
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lous users who are systematic in using hospital topics but are potentially
unusual in the combination of topics they access. Think of a group of nurses
who work in the stroke unit and commonly access patient records with neu-
rological diagnoses, but among whom there is one nurse that also accesses
obstetrics records. This may not be illegitimate but it might be appropriately
flagged as anomalous.
Random Topic Access Detection (RTAD) is based on using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) to define topics and a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) algorithm
to detect RTA. The principle novelty of the work is not the use of these
specific techniques for anomaly detection (since similar techniques have been
used in other contexts); it is the idea that detection should target RTA
users rather than ROA users. A particular insight is that RTA users can be
characterized along a spectrum based on the likely features of their behavior,
ranging from the tendency to select few topics to the tendency to select many
topics. This approach has advantages of generality over trying to simulate
open terminals, masquerading, or other attack modes directly. LDA was
ran on four months of patient records and created a list of hospital topics
that enable each patient to be described as a mixture of topics. From this
topics were derived that characterize users that access these patients and the
hospital-assigned roles of these users. This work focuses on five roles and
three different kinds of users, allocated between the two extreme cases where
users favor a few topics strongly to users who favor many topics weakly. For
each of these cases we computed the Area Under Curve (AUC) from Reciever
Operating Curves (ROCs) for detecting RTA users. These studies have led
to variety of findings. For instance, the effectiveness of RTAD varies based
on the class of topics used (for instance, diagnoses or medications or both).
Given the best approach topic model for each of the five roles, we find that
RTAD works better for each role than it works on the collection of all users
if they are described by a few topics, but performance declines for users that
are more topic-agnostic in four of the five roles. More results of these kinds
appear in the analysis section.
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1.3.1 Summary of the Main Contributions
Now, let us summarize our discussion in section 1.3 to provide potential
solutions to the challenges mentioned in section 1.2 and focus on the main
contributions of this work. Some of the major contributions are as follows:
1. This work introduces and studies the random topic access model, RTA,
aimed at the users whose access may well be illegitimate but is not fully
random because it is focused on common hospital themes. For instance,
gynecologist who suddenly is interested in the medical records of male
patients diagnosed with erectile anxiety and depression.
2. We also propose RTAD framework for evaluating the ability to recog-
nize various types of random users i.e. (Directed user, Random User,
Indirect User). More information about these user types can be seen
in the section 5.2.
3. Another important aspect of this work is the notion of User Typing
to mine the given EMR information and audit log data to find useful
patterns of clinicians accesses to the patient’s EMR. This enables to
characterize the given clinician and build a semantic relationship with
the patient attributes such as diagnosis, procedures, medications, loca-
tion.
4. We also use multidimensional scaling to visualize the clinicians and
their probability distribution over patient attributes (derived from User
Typing) on a 3D scale. This helps us to understand the distribution of
users within the same role based on their actions. The users within a
same role are expected to behave in a similar way.
5. Our method also provides a way to dynamically combine roles based on
the similarity of the user distribution and the distance among different
roles. We can cluster roles together based on the type of patients they
access according to each attribute of the patient or their combination.
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1.4 Structure of This Thesis
Chapter 2 describes in more detail the current research in Health Informa-
tion Technology and gives thorough background information on the insider
threat detection models for hospitals. Section 2.1 explains various clinical
terminologies used in the EMR dataset such as ICD-9 Diagnosis, ICD-9-CM
Procedures and RxNorm for medications. This helps us understand the dif-
ferent features in the given dataset. Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 explain various
threat detection models.
Chapter 3 aims at providing insight into the Northwestern Memorial Hospi-
tal EMR and Audit log dataset. The data description in section 3.1 explains
the architecture of the EMR and Audit log dataset respectively. Also, the
relationship between both the dataset can be understood with respect to the
diagnosis, procedures, medication, locations and services of the patient. Ta-
ble 3.3 shows the 10 most frequent occurring features in the dataset.
Chapter 4 is the highlight of this thesis work and lays a strong foundation
for the RTAD model discussed in Chapter 5. Section 4.1 introduces LDA
Topic Model and explains it in the context to our problem. The section 4.3
formalizes the User Typing approach to derive user attributes from the pa-
tients and characterize the users in terms of patients. The topics derived in
the section 4.1 are summarized in the section 4.3.
Chapter 5 formalizes the Random Topic Access model (RTAD) to detect
various types of intruders in the system namely (direct, completely random
and indirect users) in section 5.2, whereas section 5.1 explains the mathe-
matical model behind k-nearest neighbor to detect outliers in the system.
Chapter 6 discussed the experiment and analysis of RTAD model discussed
in Chapter 5, for anomaly detection for five major hospital roles. We com-
pare AUC’s across all roles and all values of alphas.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with summarization of results and potential
future scope of this work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
This chapter highlights the main contributions in the literature for insider
threat detection for hospitals. The section 2.1 introduces various standard
clinical terminologies used in most of the EMR systems to denote patients
diseases, surgeries and medications. Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 we highlight the
main differences between our approach and the existing models.
2.1 Clinical Terminologies
Medicines complex language is represented in clinical terminology and vocab-
ulary systems. Clinical terminologies represent terms related to the medical
field while vocabularies are collections of terms. Both clinical terminologies
and vocabularies provide a way to capture detailed data in an electronic
health record (EHR). They support the transformation of paper-based to
electronic records by providing a machine-readable data structure. Clinical
terminologies are considered the input format while classification systems are
the output format. Three main terminologies used in the analysis are ICD-9
Diagnosis [8], ICD-9-CM [9] Procedures and RxNorm [10].
2.1.1 ICD-9 Diagnosis
The International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, (ICD-9) [8] is
based on the World Health Organizations Ninth Revision, International Clas-
sification of Diseases (ICD-9). ICD-9 is the official system of assigning codes
to diagnoses and procedures associated with hospital utilization in the United
States. ICD-9 is used to code and classify mortality data from death cer-
tificates. ICD-9 consists of a numerical list of the disease code numbers in
tabular form; An alphabetical index to the disease entries, and A classifi-
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cation system for surgical, diagnostic, and therapeutic procedures . ICD-9
diagnosis codes can be categorized into three levels. The lowest level consists
of thousands of diagnosis chapters, where each chapter is a particular diag-
nosis code. The middle level has about 1000 diagnosis chapters where each
diagnosis chapter might contain group of codes based on similarity of diag-
nosis. The highest level consists of 19 Diagnosis chapters binded together as
a high level concept of different diagnosis. The structure of these chapters
are represented as trees. For example a diagnosis 500 can be divided further
but can be mapped directly to 500(Highest level) or 501(Middle Level) or
501.2(Lowest Level). The values are in the range [0, 1000], E[0-999], V[0-99].
For instance: ICD-9 Diagnosis codes for “complications of pregnancy,
childbirth, and the puerperium” are in the range [630-679]. Hence all dif-
ferent categories of related diagnosis are listed in the same range. They can
be further divided into seven different categories i.e. [630-633], [634-639],
[640-649], [650-659], [660-669], [670-676] and [678-679]. For example, range
[660-669] is classified as “Complications occurring mainly in the course of la-
bor and delivery” where 660 is ’Obstructed labor’ and can be further divided
into four subcategories- i) [660.01]: Obstruction, malposition, delivered ii)
[660.11]: Obstruction, bony pelvis, delivered iii) [660.41]: Shoulder dystocia,
delivered iv) [660.61]: Trial of labor, failed, delivered.
2.1.2 ICD-9-CM Procedures
ICD-9-CM procedure codes [9] are based on the official version of the World
Health Organizations Ninth Revision, International Classification of Dis-
eases, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) contains codes for operations and
procedures performed on an inpatient basis. The range varies from [0,100].
The highest level consists of 18 Procedure chapters binded together as a
high level concept of different procedure. The structure of these chapters are
represented as trees.
For instance: ICD-9-CM Procedure codes for “Obstetrical Procedures” are
in the range [72-75]. Hence all different categories of related procedures are
listed in the same range. They can be further divided into four different
categories i.e. [72.0-72.9], [73.01-73.99], [74.0-74.99] and [75.0-75.99]. For
example, range [74.0-74.99] is classified as “Cesarean section and removal of
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fetus”, which can be further divided into six subcategories- i) [74.0]: Classical
cesarean section ii) [74.1]: Low cervical cesarean section iii) [74.2]: Extraperi-
toneal cesarean section iv) [74.3]: Removal of extratubal ectopic pregnancy
v) [74.4]: Cesarean section of other specified type vi) [74.91-74.99]: Cesarean
section of unspecified type.
2.1.3 RxNorm
RxNorm [10] is two things: a normalized naming system for generic and
branded drugs; and a tool for supporting semantic interoperation between
drug terminologies and pharmacy knowledge base systems. The National
Library of Medicine (NLM) produces RxNorm. Hospitals, pharmacies, and
other organizations use computer systems to record and process drug infor-
mation. Because these systems use many different sets of drug names, it
can be difficult for one system to communicate with another. To address
this challenge, RxNorm provides normalized names and unique identifiers
for medicines and drugs. The goal of RxNorm is to allow computer systems
to communicate drug-related information efficiently and unambiguously.
For instance: RxNorm group source data into collections of synonyms
(called concepts). The drug Naproxen can be referred as Naproxen Tab
250 MG, Naproxen 250mg tablet (product), NAPROXEN @250 mg@ORAL
@TABLET, Naproxen 250 MILLIGRAM In 1 TABLET ORAL TABLET,
NAPROXEN 250MG TAB,UD [VA Product]. Although the drug names in
this Naproxen example appear different, they all have the same meaning at
a certain level of abstraction. RxNorm groups these as synonyms into one
concept by various relationships like - “ingredient of”, “isa”, “has dose form”
or “has ingredient”.
2.2 Random Object Access Model
The ideal way to evaluate the effectiveness of an intrusion detection system is
with actual intruders. This is quite difficult for studies in the area of hospital
information systems since there is very little real data of this kind available
for study. The notable exception is a study of supervised learning [11] where
real intrusion data and accesses deemed suspicious by administrators were
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used to train a classifier that achieved reasonable results. Getting this type
of data and access to these sorts of experts is very difficult. Moreover, the
ability of “expert” analysts is somewhat questionable, since most hospital
personnel are not trained at detecting security violations.
For these reasons, most work is validated by detecting anomalous users
and anomalous access patterns specifically for ROA type models where the
evaluation is conducted by synthetic users accessing random patients. For
instance, MetaCADS [12] does anomaly detection based on Singular Value
Decompositions (SVD) of user-patient access and patient-feature matrices.
Their evaluation centers on the recovery of users generated via ROA using k-
NN with eigenvectors weighted by their eigenvalues. This approach obtains
good AUC values for ROA. Our analysis with RTAD considers subpopu-
lations of users by role based on RTA. Additionally, although MetaCADS
utilizes SVD for dimensionality reduction, the resulting features only group
dimensions together according to their contribution to the variance to the
system, not their semantic coherence.
It might be useful to note that MetaCADS was designed to find anomalous
users whereas SNAD [13] was designed to find specific anomalous accesses
of the users. EBAS [14] determines reasons for the access to patients by the
users based on the assumption that for each department the employees are
responsible for specific diagnosis. The anomaly detection framework works
on the level of hospital-designated departments rather than individual user
probability for the given diagnosis. The assumption is that departments are
groups of employees with similar responsibilities who behave similarly. The
effectiveness of this technique is validated by an ROA model where users
who randomly access patient records are added to the hospital and used to
measure accuracy.
There is some literature about detecting anomalous records in more gener-
alized dataset. For instance, [15] uses association rule mining and Bayesian
approaches to discover outliers in categorical dataset. This work does not
account for heterogeneous dataset such as electronic medical record (EMR)
systems and the associated user-level access logs. It also assumes no prior in-
formation regarding the interaction of attribute sets, something which could
be a valuable resource for healthcare professionals.
12
2.3 Masquerading User Model
There is also a good body of work [16, 17, 18, 19] on threat detection models
for masquerading users. Masquerading corresponds to people who actively
try to portray themselves as legitimate users. They often mimic the behavior
of trusted users and then deviate to perform activities that are a deviation
from expected activities. These techniques provide an interesting contrast
with the ones we present below. Authors in [19] have tried to create threat
detection models for masquerading users in GUI based systems by extract-
ing relevant features through SVD and using supervised learning to classify
anomalous behavior. Our study differs from their approach in two respects:
the first is in the size of the dataset. While [19] only includes the activity of
three different users, we have annotated information for thousands of users
and patients collected over a four year span. The second is with respect to
the feature space. We argue, once again, that the latent topic space pro-
vides more semantically coherent and intuitive features than those obtained
through SVD. With respect to [18], they use a Markov Model trained on
real user commands and then show that if they generate commands using
the Markov Model and inject these commands into classifier, they are not
detected. Even though the commands were not generated by a user. It is
not anomaly detection but a way of circumventing anomaly detection. The
authors in [16] and [17] extend research in masquerade detection using UNIX
commands issued by the users and applied supervised learning mechanism
to predict the anomalous users but these approaches generally do not scale
well for large access logs in a dynamic environment such as healthcare.
2.4 Process Mining Model
Process mining is useful for at least two reasons. First of all, it could be
used as a tool to understand how people and/or procedures really work.
Process mining could be used to gain insight into the actual process, e.g.,
the flow of patients in a hospital. In such an environment, all activities are
logged, but information about the underlying process is typically missing.
Secondly, process mining could be used for comparing the actual process
with some predefined process model. Such a model specifies how people
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and organizations are expected to work. By comparing the descriptive or
prescriptive process model with the discovered model, discrepancies between
both can be detected and used to improve the process and identify deviations
and anomalies. [20] and [21] illustrates the use of heuristic mining and fuzzy
mining to understand the hospital workflows. In general, heuristic mining
is suitable for accounting the errors, deviations, and random activities in
real world events. Fuzzy mining provides a way to handle complex and
unstructured process by focusing on important activities and relations.
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Chapter 3
Dataset Analysis
Dataset analysis is an important step in heading towards formalizing our
RTAD model. The dataset from Northwestern Memorial Hospital are central
to the thesis study and have been collected by Cerner Systems over a period
of four months. It consists of over 5 million accesses made by 8000 clinicians
to 14,000 patients and has two main parts i) Electronic Medical Record
data ii) Audit Log data. The EMR dataset contains patient’s health history
including diagnosis, procedures and medications in an encounter, whereas
the audit log data contains the information about the user and his accesses
to the patients at a given time and patient - location and service. Section
3.1 describes the entire dataset in detail. In section 3.2 we analyze some
important statistics about the dataset, which will help us understand the
data.
3.1 Data Description
Our dataset consists of all user accesses, or audit logs, made over a four
month period, in addition to Electronic Medical Record (EMR) data for pa-
tients admitted in this time frame. Patient and user IDs were anonamized for
security purposes. As a noise reduction measure, we filtered all out-patient
entries, focusing only on patients who stayed a significant amount of time at
the hospital (more than 24 hours). We further removed all younger than 17
years old (about 9.1% of the records) from the dataset, as patients from this
age group tended to have sparsely populated records. After preprocessing,
our dataset consisted of 4.9 million accesses made by 7932 users to 14606 pa-
tients. EMR data was accumulated with respect to given hospital visits for
patients at the hospital, referred to as an encounter; however this data does
not attribute specific information in the record of a patient to the authorita-
15
tive user, only permitting the association of a group of users to a patient. To
prevent associating certain patient features to non-relevant users, we consider
every new encounter to be a new patient. In terms of the information char-
acterizing users, audit logs provide details regarding the service and location
of a given user accesses; EMR data, on the other hand, provides information
regarding the diagnosis, medication, and procedures ordered for a particular
patient. Service, location, diagnosis, medication, service/location, and pro-
cedure are referred to as dimensions in our analysis. The following subsection
aims to elucidate the key differences between these two distinct datasets.
3.1.1 Audit Log Data
Audit logs consist of user accesses to specific patients, logging the service
the user provided and the location of the access. Service can assume one
of 30 different values while location can assume one of 49 different values.
Table 3.1 provides basic statistics summarizing this dataset. In our analysis,
we typically combine service and location into a single combined dimension
called service/location, due to the relative small size of these dimensions
compared to those in the EMR data set.
Figure 3.1 consists of 4.9 million accesses where each access is represented
in the form of an access. An access consists of a unique patient P and user
U having role R, the encounter information signifies the period of stay of the
patient in the hospital. Each access has multiple attributes for the patient
and the user. For instance, patient was accessed when he was at location L
and for service S. In the table we can see that patient Smith has been accessed
multiple times by different users at different locations and services. The same
user also accesses other patients. We can imagine this as a bipartite graph
where all the edges are from user and patient. Each user has a unique role
in the given dataset and a role can have multiple users.
3.1.2 EMR Data
EMR data in Figure 3.2 consist of different patient records, with each record
corresponding to various diagnosis, procedures, and medications. A given
dimension is a binary vector, with each bit in the vector representing the
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Figure 3.1: Mock Log Table of User Accesses for Service and Location
Figure 3.2: Mock EMR Table of Patients for Diagnosis and Procedure
presence or absence of a particular feature. A feature in this case is dependent
upon the dimension. Diagnosis, for instance, is characterized by the lowest
level of the ICD-9 code hierarchy, with 4543 unique codes [8]. Procedure
is similarly defined with respect to ICD-9-CM, albeit with less code words
(1237). Medication features is defined with respect to RxNorm, a normalized
naming system for generic and branded drugs [10]; in total, there are 642
codes. Table 3.2 provides basic statistics on the various dimensions.
It is important to note the lack of precise patient-user information in the
EMR data. Utilizing the audit logs, it is possible to associate particular
users with certain patient-encounters. However, since many users may access
a given patient-encounter, it is impossible to know exactly what diagnosis,
medication, and/or procedure a specific user contributed. This is the actual
medical record of the patient which is accessed by the users. The main
difference between the access log and EMR is that the access log is the
summary of accesses to the EMR. The data in the patients medical record
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Table 3.1: Summarized NMH Audit Log Statistics
Attribute Value
Duration of Audit Logs 4 months
Distinct Accesses 4,979,465
Distinct Patients 12,488
Distinct Patient-Encounters 14,606
Distinct Users 7,932
Average Patients Accessed per User 115
Average Accesses of Patient 340
consists of his personal information (address, name, and identity) as well as
health information which indicates the history of his procedures, medications
and diagnosis throughout the stay of the hospital. A patient can visit hospital
multiple times. If a patient visits a hospital and is not admitted, then is
considered as outpatient. If a patient is admitted for more than 24 hours, he
is considered as inpatient. For instance, in the table 3.2 we can see that the
patient P during the stay in the hospital has been diagnosed with cancer and
HIV and gone through multiple procedures i.e transplant and dialysis. In
the access log table, the data consists of the number of times user1, user50,
user6909 accesses patient P1 record in the given encounter period.
3.2 Data Statistics
The NMH dataset is rich with different type of patient and user information
and needs to be summarized in order to understand it. Table 3.1 and 3.2
summarize the basic data statistics from the NMH Audit Logs and EMR.
Also, table 3.3 shows the 10 most frequent diagnosis, procedures, medica-
tions, service and locations in the patient population. The statistics show
that 27% of the patient population has been diagnosed with hypertension,
74.8% have been given aspirin in some form, 27.5% have gone through fetal
monitoring procedure, 26.6% of the patients are on obstetrics service and
28.7% have been through the location Prentice 8 Labor & Delivery. These
statistics shows a very high degree of confidence that the dataset is skewed
towards the obstetrics population. On further analysis we find that 66.7%
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Table 3.2: Summarized NMH User-Patient Statistics
Attribute Value
Distinct User Roles 156
Distinct Patient locations 49
Distinct Patient services 30
Distinct Patient diagnoses 4,543
Distinct Patient procedures 1,237
Distinct patient medications 996
of the patients are female and most of them are in the age between 20 and
40. Figure 3.3 summarizes the access frequency patterns of the users and
roles in the NMH access log dataset. We observe that the access pattern
of the users are highly skewed. The highest accesses made by any user is
17,054 out of 4.9 million accesses. 21.3% of the users have more than 1,000
accesses in total in the audit logs. Figure 3.3 also shows the distribution of
role accesses in the NMH access log dataset. We find that most of the roles
have very high access frequency while others have very few accesses made in
the four month time period. Patient Care staff nurse made the maximum
number of accesses which amounts to 37.5% of the total accesses, followed
by NMH Resident/Fellow-CPOE, Patient Care Assistive Staff, Patient Care
Staff Nurse (Pilot), NMH Physician-CPOE etc. 50.6% of the roles have less
than 1,000 accesses which shows the sparsity in the access of atleast 80 roles
and the users within those roles. Figure 3.3 also shows the diversity of access
patterns for users to patients. The maximum unique patients accesses by a
particular user is 20.1% of the total patient population. 0.7% of the users
access more than 1,000 patients and 6.3% of the users access only 1 patient.
Finally, in Figure 3.3 we analyze the number of users within each role. This
graph analyzes the sparsity between the roles with respect to the number
of users within each role. One unique property of the dataset is that each
user has only one role and each role can have multiple users. Our analysis
show that 18% of the users have the role Patient Care Staff Nurse, 8.9%
of the users are NMH Resident/Fellow-CPOE, 8.3% of the users are NMH
Physician-CPOE, 5.9% of the users are Med Student-CPOE, 5.5% of the
users are Physician Office. We also observe that 14.5% of the roles have only
one user. These statistics help us to gain an insight into the data distribution
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Table 3.3: NMH summarized EMR: Top 10 for each Dimension
Dimension Top 10
Diagnosis Hypertension, Outcome of delivery, Other and unspec-
ified hyperlipidemia, Unspecified anemia, Type II or
unspecified type diabetes mellitus without mention of
complication, Second-degree perineal laceration, with
delivery, Esophageal reflux, Coronary atherosclerosis of
native coronary artery, Other current maternal condi-
tions classifiable elsewhere with delivery, Unspecified hy-
pothyroidism
Procedure Other fetal monitoring, Manually assisted delivery, Re-
pair of other current obstetric laceration, Other artificial
rupture of membranes, Low cervical cesarean section,
Medical induction of labor, Puncture of vessel, Transfu-
sion of packed cells, Hemodialysis
Medication Aspirin, Docusate, Bupivacaine, Potassiumchloride,
Glucose, Esomeprazole, Lactated Ringers Injection in-
travenous solution, Dalteparin, Ondansetron, Cefazolin
Service Obstetrics, Hospital Medicine, General Medicine,
Orthopedics, Gynecology, Neurosurgury, Cardiology,
Transplant Surgury, Hematology, Urology
Location Prentice 8 Labor & Delivery, ASU Recovery 65, Emer-
gency Department 1, Prentice 1 OB Triage, Prentice 11,
Prentice 13, Prentice 12, Fienberg 15 E, Fienberg 16 W,
Fienberg 10 W
across all users and roles. Now we will highlight the most frequent attributes
in the dataset.
Table 3.3 shows 10 most frequent occurring patient dimensions in the sum-
marized NMH EMR dataset. The dataset is mostly skewed towards obstetrics
patients, which is also evident from table 3.3. Almost all the dimensions and
their top features concur with obstetrics. Majority of the patients have been
diagnosed with Hypertension and delivery which are also highly correlated
in the EMR dataset. The intuition is that the majority of the females in
the hospital who are diagnosed with both these problems go through cor-
related procedures, service and location in the hospital. Other patients are
diagnosed with cardiovascular, diabetics etc, which also explains another cat-
egory of patients having heart problems. Similarly, most of these patients
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who have been diagnosed with delivery, go through obstetrics procedure such
as manually assisted delivery, fetal monitoring, repair of the current obstetric
laceration, Low cervical cesarean section etc. The highly correlated patient
location in the hospital with such diagnosis and procedure is Prentice 8 Labor
& Delivery, Prentice 13, Prentice 11 and Prentice 12. The hospital location
ASU Recovery is a place where patients go after a surgery. Hence, majority
of the patients who go through a procedure, also go through ASU Recovery.
Other locations include emergency department and Fienberg which handle
all kind of patients. Majority of the patients are given aspirin to relieve minor
aches and pains. Others are on different types of drugs such as Esomeprazole,
Dalteparin, Cefazolin etc.
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Figure 3.3: NMH Audit Log Access Summarization
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Chapter 4
Topic Modeling
The dataset described in Chapter 3 is high dimensional data for all attributes
of patients which makes it essential to uncover the underlying semantic struc-
ture of the features. Latent Dirichilet Allocation (LDA) [1] is the most
promising approach of dimensionality reduction which is a class of proba-
bilistic topic models. The intuition behind LDA is that a document contains
mixture of different topics/themes. In our case it is analogous to the fact that
patient can be represented over distribution of topic/themes for each high
dimensional attribute (say diagnosis, procedure or medication). For instance,
in case of diagnosis, the patient can be described as a probability distribu-
tion over topics of diagnosis. Each topic of diagnosis consists of probability
distribution over different ICD-9 diagnosis codes, which makes the semantic
structure of the topic intuitive and can be analyzed manually or peer review.
For example, consider using themes to explore the complete history of the
patients with mental diseases in the hospital. At a broad level some of the
themes in the hospital might correspond to the neuro, cardio, obstetrics etc.
We could zoom in on a theme of interest, such as mental illness, to reveal
various aspects of it such as alzhimer, brain tumour etc. We could then
navigate through time to reveal how these specific themes have changed.
And, in all of this exploration, we would be pointed to the original patients
relevant to the themes. This chapter is organized as follows: In section
4.1 and 4.2, we will discuss the mathematical model behind LDA algorithm
and how it can be used to reduce dimensions of the patients in our dataset.
Section 4.3 formalizes the User Typing, which is one of the main contributions
of this thesis. We define the user and patient relationship based on the topic
derived in section 4.1 and use it to characterize the user based on the given
dataset. In section 4.4, we summarize the topics derived in section 4.1 and
give an intuition of the general themes in the hospital related to different
dimension of the patient. In section 4.5 we use Multi Dimensional Scaling
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to visualize the users derived in section 4.3 to gain more intuition into the
distribution of users within same role.
4.1 Latent Dirichilet Allocation
In this section we explain how we extract different features from the access
logs and how to represent user actions such that different actions can be
reliably discriminated from each other.
At the heart of our anomaly detection method is a semantic representation
of the access log data given as an input. In order to detect illicit access to
resources we must represent the data at hand in a way that (1) enables
a numerical comparison between observations and (2) preserves semantic
information about the medical aspects of what has been done in atomic user
actions. Imagine how a domain expert would manually analyze a given audit
log. Clearly, the main approach would be to relate the user actions with
what makes sense from a medical perspective and from the processes that
are typical in the respective hospital. Similarly, we pre-process the given data
such that observed user actions are expressive with respect to the medical
aspects and processes.
In an attempt to quantitatively represent the given audit logs and to fulfill
the requirements given above, we employ Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
[1]. LDA provides a set of topics, each represented as a bag of words that
typically arise. For each patient, we will get an allocation in the topic simplex.
We can then substitute the patient ID in each event with this vector. We
then derive the topic distribution of the users accessing the patients by user
typing in section 4.3 The dataset described above is high dimensional data for
all attributes of patients which makes it essential to uncover the underlying
semantic structure of the features. LDA is the most promising approach of
dimensionality reduction which is a class of probabilistic topic models. The
intuition behind LDA is that documents exhibit various topics. In our case it
is analogous to the fact that patient can be represented over distribution of
topics for each high dimensional attribute. For instance, in case of diagnosis,
the patient can be described over topics of diagnosis. Each topic of diagnosis
consists of probability distribution over diagnosis for that topic which makes
the semantic structure of the topic intuitive and can be analyzed manually
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or peer reviewed.
From the perspective of our problem (we use diagnosis data as an example,
but the same scheme holds for diagnosis and other features as well), LDA
assumes the following generative process of patient data.
1. Choose N ∼ Poisson(ξ)
2. Choose θ ∼ Dir(α)
3. For each symptom wn, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
(a) Choose a disease zn ∼ Multinomial(θ)
(b) Choose a symptom wn ∼ p(wn
∣∣zn, β).
Here, p(wn
∣∣zn, β) is a multinomial symptom distribution conditioned on dis-
ease zn. In a more generic setting, we will refer to topics rather than diseases
and words instead of symptoms. The graphical model of LDA is described
in Figure 4.1. Filled circles represent observed random variables. Empty
circles are latent random variables. Arrows indicate statistical dependencies.
Entities on a plate with integer N exist in N different versions. In the case
of diagnoses, θ indicates the probabilities for diseases, zn indicates presence
or absence of a disease for a patient out of M patients, and w indicates
symptoms of a patient.
RTA entails modeling users as probability distributions over topics. These
topics are defined with respect to the patient dimensions introduced in Chap-
ter 3, supersets, or concatenations of these dimensions. We utilize a latent
topic framework because modeling users as distributions over topics permits
two important operations; the first is for users to be summarized in a se-
mantically coherent way with respect to the entire user population. User
characterization in terms of the dimensions in EMR and audit log data is
independent of the characterization of other users in the system. While this
can be informative, it is of limited power, as knowledge of the user does not
convey any knowledge about how that user behaves in the context of the
system. Topic modeling, however, gives a concise description of not only
how a user behaves in the context of his peers, but what the meaning of that
behavior is. The second is it provides a mechanism for user generation. By
modeling users as samples from a Dirichlet distribution over topic multinomi-
als, a larger space is afforded of realizable users than the dataset may provide.
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 Figure 4.1: Graphical Model for Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [1].
This also has implications with respect to controlling the types of adversaries
in different threat models, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 5.
Nevertheless, topic modeling provides a lot of power and flexibility in terms
of characterizing and modeling users. While many algorithms exist for this
purpose, the standard algorithm to use is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA),
which we use for our implementation RTAD. LDA is a generative model that
attempts to model documents in a corpus as multinomials over a set of latent
topics [1]; in turn, these latent topics are modeled as multinomials over the
words in a corpus. In this manner, topics act as summaries of the differ-
ent themes pervasive in the corpus, while documents are characterized with
respect to these summaries. A d dimensional multinomial is sampled from
a d dimensional Dirichlet distribution to get a particular topic distribution.
This can be thought of as sampling from a d− 1 simplex (probability space)
controlled by a parameter to the Dirichlet: α. Typically denoted the concen-
tration parameter, α controls where on the simplex multinomials are likely
to be sampled. As α→ 0+, probability density is pushed towards the edges
of the simplex, favoring multinomials heavily biased towards few topics. As
α→ 1, probability density becomes more evenly distributed around the sim-
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plex, making any multinomial equally probable of being selected. Finally,
as α → +∞, probability density is pushed towards the center of the sim-
plex, favoring multinomials equally biased towards all topics. The number of
topics, k, and the concentration parameter, α, are defined apriori. We used
α as a control parameter to generate users at five different levels of topic-
concentration reaching from users whose actions are described by almost all
equally contributing topics to users described by a single topic only.
In modeling users, we decided to generate topics for diagnosis, medica-
tion, procedure, and service/location. Additionally, we generated topics over
the superset of all these dimensions, denoted mixed, and the concatenation
of the topic vectors of these different dimensions, denoted combined. The
logic behind modeling users in terms of mixed was to see whether or not
heterogeneous combinations of dimensions are more informative than con-
sidering them in isolation. Likewise, we looked at combined to see if a naive
concatenation of these different information types is comparable to or fa-
vorable to mixed. Section 4.4 provides a summarization for topic coherency
across these different dimensions. Coherent topics are chosen for the ser-
vice/location, procedure, diagnosis, and medication dimensions; the top 10
most probable words are displayed over 8 topics for each dimension. There
is a strong bias in these distributions towards women’s health, specifically
child birth, demonstrating the efficacy and power of LDA to capture relevant
semantic summarizations. It should be noted that with respect EMR derived
dimensions, LDA was performed on patients. We will use the section 4.3 to
reveal how these patient probabilities are translated in terms of users.
4.2 Perplexity Measure
Since the number of topics need to be chosen apriori, we utilized the perplex-
ity measure, designed to assess the effectiveness of different topic numbers.
The perplexity measure is an estimation of the expected number of equally
likely words in the population; minimizing perplexity corresponds to max-
imizing the topic variance captured by the system [1]. We performed this
analysis for each topic distribution, the number of topics corresponding to
the minimum perplexity is shown in Table 4.1. Figure 4.2 shows the various
perplexity values at different values of k (no. of topics) for procedure. To
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select the number of topics, we use the perplexity measure proposed in [1]:
perplexity(Dtest) = exp
{
−
∑M
d=1 log p(wd)∑M
d=1Nd
}
(4.1)
Here, Dtest is a collection of patient data such as a collection of M diagnosis,
wd are the symptoms of the patients. Perplexity measures the data likelihood.
High likelihood leads to a low perplexity measure. It is seen as a good measure
of performance for LDA. We keep a holdout sample, train LDA on the rest
of the data, and then calculate the perplexity of the holdout.
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Figure 4.2: Perplexity Measure for Procedure
4.3 User Typing
User typing involves characterizing user behavior according to a particular
dimension and data source. User typing with respect to Access Log data
entails accumulating all accesses of a user and performing LDA, where each
user is treated as a separate document. Typing with respect to Electronic
Health Record data is much different. Because EHR data is aggregated over
all users with respect to patients, no information exists regarding which set of
records a particular user contributes to the patient. As such, in this dataset,
users are characterized according to the types of patients they access, though
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Table 4.1: Topic Summary
Dimension # Of Topics
diagnosis 25
procedure 25
medication 25
service/location 20
mixed 40
combined 95
no assumptions are made regarding the extent to which a user contributes
to the description of an accessed patient.
In the following sections, we aim to provide a more concrete mathematical
notation for these definitions. In each section, suppose the dimensions in
Access Log data is given by DAL = Service, Location and EHR data is given
by DEHR = Diagnosis, Medication, Procedure. Furthermore, let U indicate
the set of all users, Pu denote the set of all patients a user accesses, and Au,
the set of all access made by a user. The purpose of the following sections is
to develop feature vectors for each user according to the two data sources.
4.3.1 User Typing With Access Log Data
For audit log data, users are summarized by LDA through the aggregation
of their accesses and performing LDA on those aggregates. However, with
respect to EHR data, dimensions are provided with respect to patients, not
users. Patients can be associated with certain users through cross referencing
users from the audit logs to the patients they access in the EHR dataset.
Suppose each user accesses according to some dimension d ∈ DAL described
by a vector ~au,d(i) where i indicates the i’th access of the user u. The raw
feature vector, ~fu,d for user u is simply the sum of all of u’s accesses, Au,
shown in the following:
~fu,d =
∑
i∈Au
~au,d(i) (4.2)
The topic probability vector, φu,d, is derived from transforming ~fu,d via
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LDA. Essentially, φu,d is a categorical probability distribution where for each
di ∈ d, φu,di = P (di|u).
φu,d = LDA( ~fu,d) (4.3)
4.3.2 User Typing with EHR Data
As mentioned before, typing users with EHR data is slightly more compli-
cated, due to the relatively limited amount of information about users in the
EHR dataset. There are two possible approaches to typing in this manner.
The first involves performing LDA on each patient individually and aggre-
gating the topic probabilities, referred to as post-aggregation. The second
involves aggregating raw patient vectors for each user and then performing
LDA on the user, referred to as pre-aggregation. Pre-aggregation is very
similar to user typing with Access Log data. Additionally, post-aggregation
was used in the experimental procedure. Therefore, we will proceed with a
discussion of the more complicated post-aggregation.
Suppose a patient p of user u has a record according to some dimension
d ∈ DEHR described by a vector ~fp,d. The topic probability vector, φp,d, much
like in typing Access Log data, is simply the LDA transformation of ~fp,d. To
derive the topic probability vector of the user, φu,d, the topic probabilities of
each of the patients u accesses calculated through a weighted averaged. In
particular, let Nu = |A(u)| denote the total number of accesses made by user
u and nu(p) = |Ap(u)| refer to the number of times u has accessed p. The
probability u selects p is simply nu(p)/Nu. The weighted average of each
of the patients topic probabilities is simply the expected topic probability
distribution with respect to the probability of being selected.
φu,d = E[φp,d] =
∑
p∈P (u)
nu(p)
Nu
φp,d (4.4)
This is permissible because the average of two categorical distributions is
still a categorical distribution.
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4.4 Topic Summarization
This section is based on the analysis done on the EMR dataset in the sections
4.1 and 4.2. In summary, LDA was run on the set of documents where each
patient is treated as a document and the words in the documents are the
features of the patient for a particular dimension (say diagnosis) collected
from his/her electronic medical record. The input is also the number of top-
ics, which is derived using perplexity measure in 4.2. The topics below can
be seen as themes in the hospitals for given dimension of the patient. For
instance, patient will have probability distribution of these topics/themes
which will give us the bias of this patient towards a certain theme and to
which he/she belongs. We picked 8 random topic distributions from each
dimension and give an intuition behind the derived topics and their thematic
structure for diagnosis, procedure, medications and service/location in Fig-
ures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
Summarization of Diagnosis Topics: In Figure 4.3, we observe that the
topic 04 and topic 21 are highly related to women diagnosed with either ma-
ternal conditions or delivery. Patients having high probability of topic 04 and
topic 21 are most likely women, diagnosed with obstetrics related problems.
The topic 01 is highly related to the patients diagnosed with irregularities in
their blood (i.e. lack of white/red blood cells). Most of the words with high
probability in this topic are related to blood problem. Topic 17 on the other
hand seems to be a mixture of different kind of diagnosis, mostly related to
hypertension, also related to topic 24. Topic 18 is clearly related to different
types of neoplasms (abnormal mass in the tissue). Finally, topic 20 and topic
15 are related to kidney disease and liver disease respectively.
Summarization of Service/Location Topics: In Figure 4.6, We observe that
topic 00, topic 13 and topic 19 are highly related to women who have been
diagnosed with maternal conditions or delivery. The main reason is that
they are at a very highly correlated location in the hospital i.e. prentice 12,
prentice 8 Labor & Delivery. Also, they are either on obstetrics or gynecology
service in the hospital. Topic 03 and topic 18 forms the thematic structure
for orthopedics and neurology respectively. Topic 02 and topic 10 are highly
biased towards locations treating patients with cardio problems.
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Diagnosis
topic 04 prob
delivery 0.19
cesarean 0.12
elderly multi 0.06
other maternal 0.06
sterilization 0.03
thyroid dysfunc 0.03
preech present 0.03
hypothyroidism 0.03
cord entanglement 0.02
group B strept. 0.02
topic 21 prob
delivery 0.17
abnormal heart rate 0.05
amniotic cavity 0.03
uterine inertia 0.03
hemorrhage 0.03
early delivery 0.03
fetal head 0.03
perineal laceration 0.02
cord entanglement 0.02
postterm pregnancy 0.02
Diagnosis
topic 01 prob
pancytopenia 0.04
neutropenia 0.03
thrombocytopenia 0.03
stem replacement 0.03
diarrhea 0.02
fever 0.02
anemia 0.02
multiple myeloma 0.01
myeloid leukemia 0.01
candidiasis mouth 0.01
topic 17 prob
hypertension 0.12
hyperlipidemia 0.08
hypothyroidism 0.04
esophageal reflux 0.03
atrial fibrillation 0.03
type II diabetes 0.02
ischemic attack 0.02
osteoporosis 0.01
prostate 0.01
mental disorder 0.01
Diagnosis
topic 18 prob
neoplasm of bone 0.04
neoplasm of liver 0.04
neoplasm of lung 0.03
pressure ulcer 0.03
constipation 0.03
neoplasm of brain 0.03
paraplegia 0.02
urinary infection 0.02
neoplasm of lung 0.01
palliative care 0.01
topic 24 prob
unspecified fall 0.03
occurrence, home 0.02
fall, slipping 0.02
collapse 0.02
other fall 0.01
hypertension 0.01
occurrence, other 0.01
unconscious 0.01
occurrence, street 0.01
open wound 0.01
Diagnosis
topic 20 prob
kidney disease 0.11
chronic kidney S II .11
kidney failure .08
dehydration 0.05
type II diabetes 0.02
hyperlipidemia 0.02
hyperpotassemia 0.02
urinary infection 0.02
gout, unspecified 0.01
chronic kidney S III 0.01
topic 15 prob
cirrhosis of liver 0.06
other ascites 0.05
viral hepatitis C 0.03
alcoholic liver 0.02
liver transplant 0.02
diabetes mellitus 0.02
thrombocytopenia 0.02
kidney failure 0.01
encephalopathy 0.01
portal hypertension 0.01
Figure 4.3: Summarized Topics for Diagnosis
Procedure
topic 02 prob
insert Endotracheal 0.14
venous Catheter 0.11
arterial Cath 0.10
cont Mech Vnt 0.09
cnt Mech Vnt 2 0.07
ext Infus Conc 0.03
temporary Trach 0.03
percutaneous Gast 0.03
endoscopy 0.02
trach Lavage 0.02
topic 03 prob
knee Replace 0.29
replace-Methacry 0.27
cell Tranfusion 0.10
anesth Injec 0.04
hip Bearing Surface 0.02
oth assisted 0.02
radiotherapeut 0.02
lap Appendectomy 0.01
transfusion Blood 0.01
aspiration Of Breast 0.01
Procedure
topic 09 prob
fetus/Amnion 0.24
fetal Monitor 0.22
cervical c-section 0.21
induction Labor 0.13
artf. Membrane 0.10
fetal EKG 0.03
amnioinfusion 0.00
repair OB Uteri 0.00
influenza Vaccine 0.00
instr. Delived 0.00
topic 11 prob
manual Delivery 0.33
fetal Momitor 0.30
repair Laceration 0.25
artf. Membrane 0.11
breech Extraction 0.00
peritoneal Tiss 0.00
ob Vulva 0.00
skin Biopsy 0.00
rotate Fetal Head 0.00
alveolar Incision 0.00
Procedure
topic 14 prob
cystoscopy 0.09
ureteral Cath 0.08
pyelogramy 0.05
breast Tissue 0.05
excise node 0.03
urine Incontion 0.03
vaginal Hyste 0.02
nephrostomy 0.02
mammoplasty 0.01
indwelling cath 0.01
topic 17 prob
extracorporeal 0.17
valv-Tissue 0.07
ultrasound-Heart 0.04
thor Ves Respect 0.03
valvuloplasty 0.03
cell Transfusion 0.03
venous Catheter 0.03
art Bypass 0.03
coronory Bypass 0.02
intercoastal Cath 0.02
Procedure
topic 22 prob
cervical c section 0.39
fetal Monitor 0.36
artf. Membrane 0.07
bilat Tubal 0.05
therapeutic Aphere 0.02
vacuum Extract 0.01
tubal Destruct 0.00
indcut Labor 0.00
tamponade Uterus 0.00
Adhesiolysis 0.00
topic 23 prob
prostatectomy 0.10
cervical Node 0.07
robotic Procedure 0.06
lymph Node Exc 0.05
total Abdomin 0.04
nephroureterc 0.04
remove Tubes 0.04
laparoscopy 0.03
peritonial Tiss 0.03
remove Ovar 0.02
Figure 4.4: Summarized Topics for Procedures
4.5 Multidimensional Scaling
We employed a number of visualization techniques in order to see how the
data was distributed in three dimensional space. With topic attributes of
various dimensions, we reduced the dimensionality of the data to three di-
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Medication
topic 00 prob
clindamycin 0.32
gentamicin 0.18
ampicillin 0.11
aspirin 0.10
bupivacaine 0.06
docusate 0.06
ibuprofen 0.06
lactated injec 0.04
ondansetron 0.03
ferroussulfate 0.01
topic 03 prob
multivitamins 0.10
ascorbicacid 0.08
levetiracetam 0.07
docusate 0.06
aspirin 0.05
zincsulfate 0.04
esomeprazole 0.04
potassiumchloride 0.04
dexamethasone 0.04
oxacillin 0.04
Medication
topic 04 prob
vancomycin 0.08
multivitamins 0.08
warfarin 0.07
docusate 0.07
cefazolin 0.07
bupivacaine 0.06
esomeprazole 0.06
aspirin 0.05
ferrousgluconate 0.05
celecoxib 0.04
topic 10 prob
ketorolac 0.14
cefazolin 0.12
lactated ringers inj 0.11
aspirin 0.10
ibuprofen 0.10
docusate 0.10
simethicone 0.08
tripedia 0.05
bupivacaine 0.04
ondansetron 0.02
Medication
topic 17 prob
trimethoprim 0.08
tacrolimus 0.08
mycophenolatem 0.06
prednisone 0.06
methylprednis 0.04
famotidine 0.03
valganciclovir 0.03
aspirin 0.03
insulin 0.03
bupivacaine 0.02
topic 14 prob
magnesiumsulfate 0.05
morphine 0.05
furosemide 0.05
metoprolol 0.04
glucose 0.04
heparin 0.04
insulin 0.04
potassiumchl 0.03
vancomycin 0.03
docusate 0.03
Medication
topic 18 prob
polyethylene 0.11
docusate 0.10
bisacodyl 0.08
simethicone 0.06
bupivacaine 0.05
diazepam 0.04
aspirin 0.04
magnesiumcitrate 0.03
vancomycin 0.03
lactulose 0.02
topic 09 prob
ibuprofen 0.15
oxytocin 0.15
docusate 0.14
lactated inject 0.14
tripedia 0.10
aspirin 0.10
bupivacaine 0.05
penicillin 0.05
influenza vac. 0.02
rhodimmuneglob 0.02
Figure 4.5: Summarized Topics for Medications
mensions, such that distances between points in the higher dimensional topic
space were preserved. The easiest method for doing this was to find the 3
principle components of the data, via principle component analysis (PCA)
[22], and plot points along these vectors. While easy to implement, this only
de-correlated dimensions. Another, more advanced approach we considered
was Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) [23] [24]. MDS consists of a suite of
dimensionality reduction and scaling techniques for preserving inter point
distances as much as possible; it comes in two general forms, metric and
non-metric. An MDS algorithm starts with a matrix of item - item simi-
larities, then assigns a location to each item in N-dimensional space, where
N is specified a priori. [23] For sufficiently small N, the resulting locations
may be displayed in a graph or 2D visualization techniques such as scatter
plots. However, not all dataset were capable of being transformed using this
method; in such instances, we used PCA to transform the data. It should
be noted that the data operated on was already transformed at the time of
visualization via LDA; thus, dimensions were already fairly independent.
MDS has now become a general data analysis technique used in a wide va-
riety of fields [24]. MDS pictures the structure of a set of objects from data
that approximates the distances between pairs of the objects. Each object
or event is represented by a point in a multidimensional space. The points
are arranged in this space so that the distances between pairs of points have
the strongest possible relation to the similarities among the pairs of objects.
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Service/Location
topic 00 prob
prentice 12 0.30
prentice 8 l&d 0.28
obstetrics 0.27
prentice triage 0.12
nst triage 0.00
fienberg 8e sicu 0.00
communicable 0.00
pediatrics 0.00
gynecology 0.00
outp 0.00
topic 02 prob
general medicine 0.18
fienberg 15e 0.18
cardiology 0.18
fienberg 14e 0.16
ccu 0.10
emergency dept 1 0.07
fienberg 15w 0.03
micu 0.03
nicu 0.03
csu 0.00
Service/Location
topic 03 prob
orthopedics 0.33
fienberg 14w 0.27
asu recovery 65 0.27
fienberg 10 se 0.08
padm 0.01
fienberg 8e sicu 0.00
plastic surgery 0.00
oa surg 0.00
nicu 0.00
fienberg 13 w 0.00
topic 08 prob
fienberg 12w 0.21
general surgery 0.19
emergency dept 1 0.16
fienberg 12e 0.07
fienberg 8e sicu 0.07
surgery endocrine 0.07
edm 0.06
fienberg 11e 0.02
nicu 0.02
surgical oncology 0.01
Service/Location
topic 10 prob
fienberg 11w 0.3
cardio thoracicsurg 0.18
fienberg 7e cticu 0.18
asu recovery 65 0.18
vascular surgery 0.18
fienberg 8e sicu 0.09
padm 0.04
fienberg 15e 0.01
ccu 0.00
fienberg 10se 0.00
topic 13 prob
prentice 14 0.36
prentice asu 0.25
gynecology 0.15
gyneoncology 0.11
plastic surgery 0.05
surgical oncology 0.02
fienberg 8e sicu 0.00
emergency dept 1 0.00
radiology 0.00
edm 0.00
Service/Location
topic 18 prob
fienberg 10w 0.25
neurosurgery 0.19
nicu 0.15
neurology 0.12
fienberg 10se 0.10
asu recovery 65 0.09
emergency dept 1 0.04
padm 0.01
fienberg 10 necrc 0.00
et 0.00
topic 19 prob
gynecology 0.36
prentice 8 l&d 0.29
prentice triage 0.13
prentice 13 0.10
prentice 11 0.10
nst triage 0.01
ccu 0.00
pediatrics 0.00
icr 0.00
prentice 12 0.00
Figure 4.6: Summarized Topics for Service/Locations
That is, two similar objects are represented by two points that are close to-
gether, and two dissimilar objects are represented by two points that are far
apart. The space is usually a two- or three-dimensional Euclidean space, but
may be non-Euclidean and may have more dimensions [25]. We have imple-
mented two types of MDS methods i) Metric Classical MDS ii) Non-Metric
Classical MDS [25] defined as follows:
i) Metric multidimensional scaling : A superset of classical MDS that gen-
eralizes the optimization procedure to a variety of loss functions and input
matrices of known distances with weights and so on. A useful loss function
in this context is called stress, which is often minimized using a procedure
called stress majorization.
ii) Non-metric multidimensional scaling : In contrast to metric MDS, non-
metric MDS finds both a non-parametric monotonic relationship between the
dissimilarities in the item-item matrix and the Euclidean distances between
items, and the location of each item in the low-dimensional space. The rela-
tionship is typically found using isotonic regression.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the results of MDS on the user typing in section 4.3.
The first Figure shows the distribution of all the users in 3D space based
on their access to particular diagnosis topic (derived from LDA). The green
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 Figure 4.7: User Typing Visualization for Diagnosis
dots are the users within same role, whereas the blue dots are all the users
irrespective of the role. For instance, the users who access patients having
diagnosis neurological disorders will be at less distance than another user
accessing patients of type obstetrics. In 4.7 we can see that the green dots
represent clusters of users having role respiratory, but some users of the same
role are at a far distance from the original cluster, which may be an outlier.
In Chapter 5, we develop a framework to detect such outliers in the system.
The figure also shows the roles cluster together whose users behave in a
similar way. Hence, we can find RAD cluster, Psychiatry cluster, Obstetrics
cluster etc. which also give us an insight into combining different similar
roles dynamically based on the access of the users.
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Chapter 5
Anomaly Detection Model
Anomaly Detection is the process of finding outliers from a given data set.
According to the anomaly detection survey [26] the techniques can be grouped
into following categories: classification based, nearest-neighbor based, clus-
tering based and statistics based. Classification based algorithms are mainly
supervised algorithms that assume distinction between anomalous and nor-
mal instances can be modeled for a particular feature space. For instance,
given a user and label (normal or anomalous), we can learn a binary classifier
to predict if the new user is anomalous or not based on the feature space.
Whereas, nearest-neighbor based algorithms assume that anomalies lie in
sparse neighborhoods and that they are distant from their nearest neighbors.
They are mainly unsupervised algorithms. One example of such algorithm
is k-nearest neighbor algorithm which is explained in section 5.1. Clustering
based algorithms work by grouping similar objects into clusters and assume
that anomalies either do not belong to any cluster, or that they are distant
from their cluster centers or they belong to small and sparse clusters. At last,
the statistical techniques such as chi-square analysis can be done to compare
the expected distribution over observed distribution and if they differ signif-
icantly then we can detect outliers. The intuition is that if the confidence
level of any attribute in the observed distribution is significantly lower than
in the expected distribution, then it is termed as anomalous. The chapter
is organized as follows: section 5.1 discusses the mathematical model behind
the k-nearest neighbor technique and how we can use it in our RTAD frame-
work. In section 5.2 we formalize our model by defining various anomalous
users for detection based on k-nearest neighbor and LDA, discussed in section
4.1.
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5.1 k-Nearest Neighbor
An anomalous user is a user whose distance from its nearest neighbors is
sufficiently large with respect to the average distance between the neighbors.
Distance in our definition is defined as the Euclidean distance between dif-
ferent user points in space. Users with the same role are plotted according
to their conditional attribute values or topic distributions: P (DP | U). The
topic probability distribution has been derived in section 4.3 where we de-
rived the user topics from the patients based on the accesses of the user. For
the purposes of determining anomalous users, we use the k nearest neighbor’s
algorithm, which tags outliers with the same definition we gave to anomalous
users. To formulate this, suppose the set of nearest neighbors for user U is
N(U). Let the average distance between nearest neighbors be defined as the
following:1
dNN =
∑
n,m∈N(U),n 6=m
dist(n,m)
K(K−1)
2
=
2
K2 −K
∑
n,m∈N(U),n 6=m
dist(n,m) (5.1)
Similarly, let the average distance between the user and each neighbor be
defined as the following:
dNU =
1
K
K∑
i=1
dist(u, ni) (5.2)
Given this, a user is recorded as anomalous according to the following
piecewise equation, where β is the chosen threshold.
f(U,K) =
anomalous dNNdNU > βregular otherwise
5.2 Random Topic Access Model
The Random Topic Access (RTA) model is a framework for describing anoma-
lous users in terms of random topics, as opposed to random access patterns.
1There are K(K−1)2 pairs of K nearest neighbors
36
Randomness in this sense can take on many subtle definitions. Within this
framework, we argue that certain types of attackers can be elegantly and ac-
curately synthetically generated. We will proceed with a discussion of these
types of anomalous users followed by a review of our implementation of this
framework, RTAD. Considering the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate
prior of the multinomial, we felt it appropriate to convey our argument with
respect to the concentration parameter, α. Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 use MDS
to project all the users in the system based on their diagnosis information
(derived in user typing). We then sample 5% of the directed users from
the Dirichlet distribution and insert into the system to visualize the overall
distribution of normal users with respect to directed users.
5.2.1 Dirichlet Distribution
Let us first get an insight into the Dirichlet distribution and its concentra-
tion parameter α. The Dirichlet distribution [27] is a family of continuous
multivariate probability distributions parametrized by a vector α of positive
reals. It is the multivariate generalization of the beta distribution. Dirichlet
distributions are very often used as prior distributions in Bayesian statistics,
and in fact the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the categorical
distribution and multinomial distribution. The space of all m-dimensional
multinomials is an (m− 1)-simplex by definition, and so the Dirichlet distri-
bution can also be thought of as a distribution over a simplex.
Algebraically, the distribution is given by
Dir(p|α1, . . . , αm) = 1
Z
∏
k
pαk−1k
where Z =
∏m
k=1 Γ(αk)
Γ(
∑m
k=1 αk)
is a normalization factor. 2
There are m parameters αk which are assumed to be positive. Figure 5.1
in [28] shows the density plots (blue=low, red=high) for the Dirichlet distri-
bution over the probability simplex in 3D for various values of the parameter
α. The author in [29] further explains that when α = [k, k, k] for some k > 0,
the density is symmetric about the uniform pmf (which occurs in the middle
2Γ(x) denotes the Gamma function and is defined to be:
∫∞
0
tx−1e−tdt.
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of the simplex), and the special case α = [1, 1, 1] shown in Figure 5.1 part
3 and has the uniform distribution over the simplex. In our RTAD model,
this is analogous to selecting topics (say 3 topics) from the simplex such that
the probability of selecting each topic is completely random and unbiased
towards any part of the simplex. When 0 < k < 1, there are sharp peaks of
density almost at the vertices of the simplex and the density is concentrated
at the corners of the simplex, as seen in 5.1 part 2. Hence, the probability
of selecting each topic in this case is not completely random and is biased
towards the corners of the simplex having high density points. When k > 1,
the density becomes concentrated in the center of the simplex, as shown in
the Figure 5.1 part 1.
 
Figure 5.1: Density Plots for Dirichlet Distribution α > 1, α < 1, α = 1
5.2.2 Directed or Masquerading User: α < 1
The first type of user the RTA model is capable of capturing is the directed
or masquerading user. In this scenario, an anomalous user of some specialty
gains sole access to the terminal of another user in the hospital. In this sense,
the anomalous user is masquerading as the real user, making accesses related
to his specialty while logged in as another user. Differentiating the anomalous
user from the real user are the topics ascribed to the anomalous user’s access
patterns. While these topics may be ordinary with respect to the hospital
population, it could be deviant with respect to the population of users similar
to the real user. The anomalous user in this case could be sampled from a
Dirichlet with α < 1, since real users are assumed to be strongly biased
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towards a set of few topics. Given a real user with an typical type of topic
distribution, it is highly probable that generating random anomalous users
will result in anomalous users not biased towards the same topic as the real
user.
 
Figure 5.2: Injected Directed Users for α < 1
5.2.3 Purely Random User: α = 1
The second type of user the RTA model can handle is the purely random
user. This type of user is characterized by completely random behavior, with
little semantic congruence to the hospital setting. This is the ideal form of
randomization that ROA models aspire to capture. However, because RAO
models preferentially sample randomly from the data, it would be expected
that not all random behaviors would be realized. By generating random users
from a Dirichlet with α = 1, any type of random user can be generated. This
has the nice property of allowing the system to be tested against input that
has not even been seen in the data yet.
5.2.4 Indirect User: α > 1
The third type of user modeled by RTA is the indirect user. This user type
resembles an even blend of the topics of many specialized users. The best
analogy in the hospital setting is the open terminal problem. In this scenario,
a user leaves the access to his terminal open for everyone to use; out of sheer
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 Figure 5.3: Injected Completely Random Users for α = 1
convenience, users of many different specializations log in and make accesses
under this user’s account. Because the resulting accesses are made by many
different kinds of users, the logged in user resembles a sort of average of
these different extreme values. This anomalous user can best be modeled
with α > 1 in the Dirichlet distribution. This would result in sampling
preferentially from the middle of the simplex, where topic probabilities are
seemingly unbiased to every topic.
 
Figure 5.4: Injected Indirect Users for α > 1
With these different types of random users modeled in our system, we
move to our implementation of the RTA model.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Results and Evaluation
Our RTA framework, RTAD, consists of running LDA on the entire pop-
ulation of users, typing users with respect to their accesses and patients,
identifying the 5 most populated user roles, and injecting anomalous users
into each role at a 5% mix rate for various α settings: 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100.
Utilizing a simple k-NN algorithm, for each of the 5 most populated users
and each α, we generated AUCs from the corresponding ROC curves gen-
erated by a simple linear classifier, utilizing the distance ratio in k-NN for
each point as a moving threshold. The k in k-NN varied from 2 to 20 and for
each role, all feature topics were evaluated. For the purposes of comparison,
we performed the same analysis for each of the individual α values on the
whole user population. A visualization of the effect of these different α values
on one of these roles is given in Figure 6.1. Utilizing classical multidimen-
sional scaling for dimensionality reduction, we graphed the projections of the
high dimensional topic space for NMH Resident Fellow CPOE and different
α such that the pairwise distance between users was preserved. Real users
are shown in blue while anomalous users are shown in red. As can be seen
comparing the top plots to the bottom plots, α values less than 1 result in
a greater amount of dispersion with respect to real users than α >= 1. As
α increases, the random users become more and more clustered, making the
anomaly detection more difficult. This chapter is organized as follows: sec-
tion 6.1 describes the basic statistics about the roles in the experiment and
the distribution of users within the roles. Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 analyze
anomaly detection experiments for all five roles, for different values of α.
Section 6.5 summarizes the analysis and discusses the intuition behind the
results.
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α = 0.1α = 0.01
α = 1 α = 100
Figure 6.1: NMH Resident Fellow CPOE (mixed topics)
6.1 Role Description
In Chapter 3 we observed the sparse nature of the dataset where very few
roles have very large number of accesses and most of the roles have few
accesses and users with the role. For the same reason, we decided to do the
analysis on five most populated roles with respect to number of users within
that role in the NMH dataset. Note that it does not change any aspect of the
analysis as the experiments are independent of the role chosen and can be
done on any given role. Basic description of the roles selected in our analysis
is as follows:
1. Med Student CPOE : All the users in this role made 149,683 accesses in
total of four month time period and the total number of users within
this role is 475. The mix rate of 5% random users gives 23 random
users.
2. NMH Resident Fellow CPOE : All the users in this role made 722,137
accesses in total of four month time period and the total number of
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users within this role is 710. The mix rate of 5% random users gives
35 random users.
3. NMH Physician Office CPOE : All the users in this role made 48,305
accesses in total of four month time period and the total number of
users within this role is 250. The mix rate of 5% random users gives
12 random users.
4. Physician Office : All the users in this role made 68,111 accesses in
total of four month time period and the total number of users within
this role is 422. The mix rate of 5% random users gives 22 random
users.
5. Patient Care Staff Nurse : All the users in this role made 1,841,851
accesses in total of four month time period and the total number of
users within this role is 1429. The mix rate of 5% random users gives
71 random users.
6.2 Simulating Directed or Masquerading User
RTAD aims at detecting three type of anomalous users and the first kind
is defined as a directed user, discussed in 5.2. In this scenario, an anoma-
lous user of a particular speciality gains sole access to the terminal of another
user in the hospital. In this sense, the anomalous user is masquerading as the
real user, making accesses related to his specialty while logged in as another
user. In Figure 6.3 we plot the AUC curves to detect the number of directed
users captured by RTAD. In 6.3 all the users are taken into consideration
without any role information. We repeat the k-NN experiments on the users
having topic distributions from diagnosis, medications, service/location, pro-
cedures, mixed and combined. We observe that the model performs well for
the values of k > 8 in the case of service/location and for others it increases
exponentially. The best dimension observed is the mixed dimension to cap-
ture directed users in the system which is ignorant of role information. As
we see that the combined and mixed dimension performs equally well in the
case of all users, we picked these two dimensions to do the k-NN experiments
for each of the five roles shown in Figure 6.2(a) and in Figure 6.2(b). The
43
 0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
A
re
a 
U
n
d
er
 C
u
rv
e 
(A
U
C
) 
k 
Med Student CPOE Patient Care Staff Nuse
Physician Office NMH Resident Fellow CPOE
NMH Physician Office CPOE
alpha = 0.01, combined 
(a) Combined Dimension
 
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
A
re
a 
U
n
d
er
 C
u
rv
e 
(A
U
C
) 
k 
Med Student CPOE Patient Care Staff Nuse
Physician Office NMH Resident Fellow CPOE
NMH Physician Office CPOE
alpha = 0.01, mixed 
(b) Mixed Dimension
Figure 6.2: Directed User (α=0.01)
analysis shows that for the same dimension and the values of k the AUC is
different in each role. We observe that for k > 8 the AUC value for both
mixed and combined dimension, in the case of NMH Resident Fellow CPOE
is the best among all the roles. One reason for this might be that the role
NMH Resident Fellow CPOE is tightly clustered with respect to other users,
making the anomaly detection easier. In summary, to detect directed users,
RTAD performs the best in case of mixed dimension for all users and NMH
Resident Fellow CPOE, given the role information about the users. On com-
parison, mixed dimension is the best as compared to combined dimension for
directed RTAD model.
6.3 Simulating Pure Random User
Another type of user RTA model can handle is a pure random user. We have
already discussed this type of user in 5.2. This type of user is characterized by
completely random behavior, with little semantic congruence to the hospital
setting. By generating random users from a Dirichlet with α = 1, any type
of random user can be generated. In Figure 6.5(a) we perform the k-NN
experiments with respect to all the users in the system and in the absence
of role information. We repeat the experiment for all given dimensions of
the patient with respect to the user. In this case, we observe that the mixed
dimension performs the best as compared to other dimensions to detect a
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Figure 6.3: AUC Across all Users for α = 0.01
purely random user. The reason seems to be the tightly clustered users in
the case of mixed topics and hence, easier to detect anomalous users. Now, we
perform the same analysis taking combined and mixed dimensions and also
informing the system about the role of the users. In Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b),
we observe that in case of mixed dimension, Med-student CPOE performs
the worst and NMH Resident Fellow CPOE performs the best. One reason
for bad performance of a medical student might be the non-clustering of the
medical students based on their access to the patients. As medical students
are responsible for accessing different themes in the hospital, they seem like
random user which makes them difficult to differentiate from the anomalous
user. On the other hand, in the case of NMH Resident Fellow CPOE it is the
opposite. But, in the case of combined dimensions, NMH Physician Office
CPOE performs the best for values of k > 12, anomalous users appearing
more clustered with respect to real users. In summary, mixed dimension
performs the best when the system has no information about the roles, while
combined seem to perform better in the case of NMH Physician Office CPOE,
but otherwise it is consistently good in the case of mixed dimension.
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Figure 6.4: Pure Random User (α=1)
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Figure 6.5: AUC across all users for α=1 and α=100
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Figure 6.6: Indirect User (α=100)
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6.4 Simulating Indirect User
The third type of user modeled by RTA is the indirect user. The definition
of this user is also given in 5.2. This user type resembles an even blend of
the topics of many specialized users. The best analogy in the hospital setting
is the open terminal problem. In this scenario, a user leaves access to his
terminal open for everyone to use; out of sheer convenience, users of many
different specializations log in and make accesses under this users account.
This anomalous user can best be modeled with α > 1 in the Dirichlet dis-
tribution. In Figure 6.5(b), we perform the k-NN experiments with respect
to all the users in the system and in the absence of role information. We
repeat the experiment for all given dimensions of the patient with respect
to the user. We observe that the system performs very poor in detecting
indirect user. The reason is that the random users injected in the system
are clustered together and hard to detect as an outlier. Service/Location
performs as the best dimension among others to best differentiate indirect
RTA user from the other users. In Figures 6.6(a) and 6.6(b), we observe
that in the case of mixed dimension, almost all the roles perform bad except
NMH Physician Office CPOE and the performance increases for the values
of k > 12. NMH Physician Office CPOE shows similar results in the case of
combined dimension. We will explore the reason for this inversion in the next
section. In general medical student CPOE seems to be performing the worst
among all the roles. Though in the case of indirect users, both combined and
mixed dimension perform equally bad.
6.5 Summary of the Analysis
In summary, we compared the best AUC for each role and α. Figure 6.7
and Figure 6.8 show the best AUC’s for each role-α combination, with the
whole user population used as a control. For masquerading users α < 1, the
resulting AUC’s are extremely strong, especially for highly specialized users
(α = 0.01). This is expected; since the synthetic users are driven to the edge
of the simplex, it is highly probable they will not be biased towards the same
topic as the majority of the users in a role. As a result, they will approach
the maximum distance that can be achieved on the simplex and will appear
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Figure 6.7: The best AUC across all evaluated dimensions is plotted for
each role performing badly for α > 1.
more varied with respect to the users in the role. As the system transitions to
more random users, the resulting AUC’s suffer somewhat for all roles, except
for NMH Physician Office CPOE. In analyzing the results of NMH Physi-
cian Office CPOE, the system actually inverts itself, with anomalous users
appearing more clustered with respect to real users. This trend continues as
the system is evaluated against undirected users, which is also expected, as
the anomalous users will become more and more clustered. With respect to
the baseline, utilizing semantic role information is a huge boost to the system
for directed users and generally performs as well or better for purely random
users. Performance suffers for some roles tested against undirected users com-
pared to the baseline; this discrepancy is intuitive in the context of k-NN as
the simplex is more populated in the baseline case, meaning that there is a
higher likelihood of local clusters of users across different roles. With respect
to the Med-Student CPOE role, our findings regarding the response of this
role to the RTA framework make intuitive sense. Medical students typically
undergo rotations where they specialize in a particular area of medicine for a
fixed amount of time. As a result, over the 4 month sampling interval, they
will have accummulated many different kinds of accesses into their history.
As a result, it would be expected that this role would suffer the most when
tested against the purely random user, as this is what the average medical
student could be modeled as. Additionally, it is no surprise that the results
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Figure 6.8: The best AUC across all evaluated dimensions is plotted for
each role performing well or near average for α > 1.
recover somewhat as the anomalous users become more tightly clustered, but
less random.
Regarding our inquiry of which dimension outperforms others with respect
to AUC, there is not any clear advantage from utilizing mixed information
versus concatenated vectors or mixed topics versus single dimension topics.
The best topic dimensions selected for each role - α varied considerably. So
much so, that no discernible trend could be reached from this small dataset.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Scope
Overall, we were able to demonstrate a lack of coverage in the existing
methodology for evaluating security models utilizing random users. The
classical technique, modeling atypical access by completely random behavior
(ROA), is constrained by the particular dataset and can not necessarily imag-
ine all types of conceivable attackers. Utilizing latent topics models such as
LDA, the RTA model provides more robust coverage of the different type of
attackers by generating synthetic users directly from a topic simplex, as op-
posed to data. In this manner, you can think of the dataset as being a sample
from a larger, unseen population distribution. Transformation to the topic
domain may not allow us to realize new types of real users, but it enables the
system to be evaluated against potentially unseen adversaries. Additionally,
we posited some plausible adversarial archetypes with respect to the α pa-
rameter, controlling the distribution on the simplex. Future work along these
lines includes carefully controlled experimental validation of these different
types of adversaries in hospital settings as well as investigating the efficacy of
integrating labeled role information for users into the LDA component of the
RTAD framework. We also plan to extend the RTAD framework by using
Labeled LDA (supervised learning algorithm), which learns the model by the
information given in the form of patient labels. The intuition is that the clus-
ter of users formed in this case will be more compact than in unsupervised
LDA and hence it will be easier to detect anomalies in such a framework.
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